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Abstract: For over the past 100 years, legal com mentato rs have debate d the rela tive
merits of formal and substantive approaches to the interpretation of contracts; and in
recent years th e deba te has in creasin gly been condu cted in th e language of the
econom ic approach to contract law . While th is recent wave of scholarship has been
relatively successful in relating the tradition al debates o ver formalism to specific
transactional and institutional problems such as imp erfect informa tion, how ever, it
has been less p roductive in term s of generating u seful legal or policy
recommendations. This essay proposes a different approach: one that focuses on
private rather than public legal decisionm akers as its prima ry audienc e. In general,
private lawmakers are likelier to be in a better position to make practical use of the
econom ic analysis of contracts, in part because the detailed information that is
necessary to implement such ana lysis intelligently is much likelier to be available at
the individual level. Furthermore, there are many opportunities for contracting parties
to choose between relatively formal and relatively substantive interpretive regimes.
What is needed is a basic taxonomy of economic considerations that can serve as an
organizing framework for parties choosing between form and substance when
designing contracts; and the later part of the essay attempts to establish such a
taxonomy.
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The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract
Interpretation

I. Introduction
Under the modern American law of contracts, almost all applications of legal
doctrine turn on questions of interpretation; and almost all questions of interpretation
implicate the tension between form and substance. In one sense , of course, this claim
is neither rema rkable nor distinctive. In order for any lega l rule or s tandard to have
an effect on human behavior, it must be applied to particular cases; an agent seeking
to enforce or comply with a given regulation must determine its content and then
compare it to a specific fac tual contex t.1 Accordingly , the materials admissible at the
interpre tive stage, the man ner in wh ich interpretatio n is carried out, and the parties’
expectations regarding the interpretive process, will all significantly shape the
contract’s incentive and insurance properties.
In another sense, however — one familiar to specialists and scholars in the field
— interpretation looms especially large in 21st-century U.S. contract law, because
under the doctrinal provisions and practices as they have historically developed, the
prescribed interpre tive process is a re latively elaborate and intensive one. The set of
materials considered relevant to interpretive inquiries is broad; and reasonably
thorough attention to such materials is expected from those applying either the law
or the language of individual agreements. As a result, the definitive resolution of
interpre tive questions requires a relatively larger degree of time and effort than w ould
be the case if we had a system that put stricter limits on the materials to be considered
or on the r esourc es to be devoted to their consid eration. Co nventional sc holarly
wisdom, indeed , holds that contractual disputes are more d ifficult an d expe nsive to

1. For insta nce, a contr act that pr ovides that the seller m ust deliver six boxes of widgets by mid-July or face
liability for the buyer’s lost pr ofits requir es a performing or enforcing agen t to determi ne, inter alia, what
objects count as widgets and boxes, wha t acts count as delivery, wh ich dates in July count as m id-July,
what flows of costs and benefits count as profits, an d, as a pr erequisite to all of these, whether t he contra ct
ever attained the status of a legal obligation. Each of these determi nation s requires the agent to gather
and consider evidence, a nd then to engage in an act of interpret ation based on that eviden ce.
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resolve in the United States today than in other common-law countries such as
England or Canada, or than in earlier historical periods such as the early 20th century,
in part because of the greater resources demanded at the interpretive stage.2
This question — how broad and thorough should the interpretive process be? —
is commonly articulated in terms of the dichotomy of form and substance. As such,
it has long bee n a matter of p rofessional a nd acade mic debate , and has b een wide ly
discussed in both case law an d commentary. Viewed from a pedagogical perspective,
it surely presents one of the central conceptual themes of the first-year contracts class.
The question als o underlies longstanding c ontroversies in public law subjects such as
adminis trative and constitutional law, as well as in the field of theoretical
jurisprudence.
More specifically, many rules3 of contract law have the effect of privileging or
emphasizing certain types of potentially relevant interpretive materials, and
discounting or excluding others. Such rules are often termed "formal" or "formalistic"
because they confine the interpreter's attention to a subset of materials that may or
may not accurately reflect or give rise to the same inferences as would the universe
of materials as a whole. A mo re "substantive" approach to contract interpretation, in
contrast, would attempt to come to a more all-things-considered understanding, based
on all the materials reasonably available.
For example, the Statute of Frauds requires that certain agreements be expressed
in writing before they can be enforced. The Statute is subject to many well-known
exceptions, but its general effect is to confer special status on the written document
as a determinant of contractual liability. The parol evidence rule, which provides that
2. See, e.g ., P.S. Ati yah & Robert S. Summer s, Form and Substance i n Anglo-Am erica n Law: A Compa rative
Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Insti tutions (1987); Robert S. Summ ers,
Instrumen talism and American Legal Theory 136-59 (1982). In general, in this essay, in order to
maintain a more fluent and conversational style, I have not attempted to provid e exhaustive citat ions for
proposition s tha t would be reason ably fami liar to (or at least conventionally accepted by) specialists in
the field.
3. For the sake of convenience and brevity, unless the context otherwise requires, in this essay I will use the
term "rules" to denote any doctrine or principle that has recognized legal status. Rules used in this way
thus includes principles, standards, etc.
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a written document that integrates the parties' agreement may not be contradicted or
varied by evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral understandings, has a parallel
effect. Similarly, the law co nfers specia l significance on certain symbols or gestures
such as the seal (before it was abolished in most jurisdictions), or to the use of
commercial terms of art such as "f.o.b." 4 Even the classical doctrine of consideration
has been in part justified in such terms.5
As is well known to both students and scholars of contract law, however, for the
past 100 years or so the historical trend across the b oard has b een to water down such
formal doctrines in favor of a more all-things-considered analysis of what the parties
may have meant in the individual case.6 The relative balance of formal and
substan tive approaches to interp retation varies among jurisdictions and among
subfields of contract law, of course, and between statutory and common-law doctrines
(with Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code perhaps representing the avatar of
contemporary anti-forma lism).7 But one s ees this trend playe d out in all corners of
the law of contracts: in the decline of the classical doctrine of consideration and the
associated rise in influence o f the doctrine of promisso ry estoppe l 8; in the movement
from traditional notions of caveat empto r and the duty to read to the modern
reasonableness-based approach to adhesion contracts 9; in the Second Restatement's

4. See UCC 2-319.
5. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799 (1941); Holmes' famous
aphorism (in Knell v. Codman, 28 N.E . 578 (Mass. 1891)) th at "con sider ation is as much a form as a
seal."
6. See generally Eric Posner, The Decline of Formality in Contract Law, in The Fall and Rise of Freedom
of Contract 61 (F. H. Buckley ed. 1999) [hereinafter E. Posner, The Decline of Formality].
7. Danzig, The Jur ispruden ce of the Uniform Commercial Code; Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in
Commercial Law: A Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in The
Jurisprudential Foundation s of Corporate and Commercial Law, ed. Kraus & Walt [hereinafter Scott,
The Uniformity Norm] .
8. See generally Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974).
9. See, e.g ., Tod d Rakoff, Contr acts of Ad hesion : An E ssay In Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1174 (1983).
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de-emph asis of the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts 10 ; in the
development of doctrinal categories such as requirement and options contracts that
render enforc eable a rrangem ents tha t half a ce ntury a go would have fallen afoul of
traditional doctrines of mutuality and indefiniteness 11 ; in the decline of the perfect
tender rule in sales law and the associated expansion in the doctrine of substantial
performance 12 ; in the decline of the mirror image rule as a device for resolving the
battle of the forms in favor of UCC §2-207's test of material difference13 ; and in the
growth of the importance o f the duty of good faith.
While legal commentators have lon g debate d the rela tive merits of these doctrinal
developments, in recent years the debate has intensified; an d in the field o f contracts
this new debate h as increasingly been cond ucted in the language of the economic
analysis of law. Scholars ranging from Lisa Bernstein to Alan Schw artz and Robert
Scott to Eric Posner have weighed in on the topic of formalism; this flourishing of
scholarship has followed in the wake o f a wide r schoo l of thou ght that so me have
labeled the "new formalism." 14 What is n ew abo ut this new formalism, b oth in
contractual scholarship and elsewhere, is that it attempts explicitly to ground
formalism in functional terms; it tries to show how formal methods of interpretation
help to forward practical goals such a s efficiency, procedural fairness, a nd publi c
accountability.
While this rece nt wave of econom ically influenc ed scholars hip has be en relatively
successful in relating the traditional debates over formalism to specific transactional

10. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§32, 62 (1979) [hereinafter Restatement (Second)].
11. See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code § 2-306 (ALI 1995).
12. Compare Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921) with Kreyer v. Driscoll,159
N.W.2d 680, 683 (Wis. 1968).
13. Compare Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. 110 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1915). Roto-Lit h, Ltd. v. F.P.
Bartlett & Co,. 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962), Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir.
1972);
14. See, e.g., Th omas Grey, Th e New Formalism; David Charny, The New Forma lism in Con tract, 66 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 842 (1999).
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and institutional pro blems such as imperfect in formation, h owever, it has been less
produ ctive in terms of generating useful legal or policy recommend ations. In part
this is because th e lessons of this scholarship are very difficult to apply at the general
level at which a court or legislature must op erate; in part this is because p ublic
lawmakers have their own self-interested reasons for preferr ing one in terpretive
approach over another. But the fact remains that this new scholarship has not so far
influenced doctrinal developments and is not likely to do so in the future.15
This essay proposes a different approach: one that focuses on private rather than
public legal deci sion make rs as its pr imary audien ce. In general, private lawmakers
are likelier to be in a better position to make practical use of the econ omic analy sis
of contracts, in part because the detailed information that is necessary to implement
such analysis intelligently is much likelier to be available at the individua l level.
Furthermore, there are many opportunities for contracting parties to choose between
relatively formal and relatively substantive interpretive regimes. What is n eeded is
a basic taxonomy of economic considerations that can serve as an organizing
framework for parties ch oosing betw een form a nd substan ce when designing
contracts.
In this essay, accordingly, I attempt to catalog the main considerations that ought
to influence the parties’ decisionmaking regarding form and substance. Sectio n II
outlines and critiques the recent literature on formalism in contractual interpretation,
and elaborates on my argument that legal scholarship in the area should focus on
addressing private transactional lawyers, not public decisionmakers such as courts and
legislators. Section III sets out my b asic analytica l and norm ative framewo rk; it
defines more precisely what I mean by form and substance, and discusses and
critiques a theoretical argument that has been influential in the traditional literature
on contract interpretation: n amely, the a rgument that fo rmalist appro aches to
interpretation are not coherent because all interpretation presumes some common

15. Cf. Eric Posn er, Economic Analysis of Contr act Law After Th ree Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 Yale
L.J. __ (2003) [arguing generally that the economic approach does not explain the current system of
contract law, nor does it provide a solid basis for criticizing and reforming contract law.]
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basis of contextual knowledge between speaker and audience, and thus requires
attention to the relevant context. Section IV then discusses a variety of familiar
transactional problems s uch as co stly informatio n, risk allocat ion, ren t-seeking,
agency costs, and the protection of relational investments, and explains how these
problems relate to the form/substance distinction. Section V summarize s the analys is
and offers conclusions.

II. Reframing the problem of form versus substance
The historical trend away from formal and toward substantive application of
contract law has been alternately celebrated and criticized. Its defenders (e.g., Corbin,
Traynor, Gilmore, Macneil) have emphasized the mismatch between traditional
formal categories and the complexity of commercial reality, and have argued th at a
more subs tantive approa ch is required to do justice to actual bargains and to protect
commercial expectations. Its critics (e. g., Willi ston, H and, E pstein) h ave countered
that contracting pa rties can ada pt quite well to formal categories so long as the
application of such categories remains clear and stable, and that s ubstan tive
approaches, especially when applied by non-specialist judges operating at a distance
from the commerc ial setting and susceptible to influence by a host of popular and
ideological considerations, tend to und ermine the c ertainty of exchange and to defeat
the parties' intentions.

A. The economic commentators' views on the form/substance questions
The arguments o f these two camps ha ve framed bo th profession al and acad emic
discussion of contract la w for over a century. U ntil recently, h owever, co ntracts
scholars influenced by the eco nomic approach to law have had relatively little to add
to the form/sub stance deb ate. Instead, the y have focu sed their attention on direct
incentives for primary behavior such as pe rformance , breach, a nd reliance investment,
and on doctrine s and device s governing the allo cation of risk, an d have genera lly
scanted interpretative problems.
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The main exce ption to this last generalization is the flourishing literature on d efault
rules, which discusses what courts should do when a contract is incomplete, silent or
ambiguous with regard to a particular term.16 Contri butors to this literatu re have
argued that default rules should be designed to minimize the direct costs of writing
contracts by choo sing terms that mo st parties wo uld want, to enco urage the private
development of contractual terms of art, to discourage opportunism and rent–seeking
in drafting and perfo rmance, to encourage relatively informe d parties to dis close their
private information u p front, and to minimize th e costs of ex post bargaining a la
Coase.17 The creation of a default rule, h owever, still leaves parties an d their agents
with the problems of determining when it comes into play, how to tell whether the
obligations prescribed by the rule have bee n satisfied, w hat the parties must do to
overcome the presumption that the rule applies, a nd how to interpret their e fforts
when they try.18 All of these determinations require interpretations; and such

16. For in stan ce, if a contr act for the sa le of goods makes no men tion of warra nties, sh ould the court inter pret
the contr act as containing im plied warranties of merchant ability and fitness, or as providing for caveat
emptor? Similarly, if a sales contract makes no mention of price, should a court fill the gap with a
reasonable price measured at th e time of delivery (the r ule under U.C.C. §2–305), a r easonable pr ice
measured as of the time of the making of the contract (the rule under the UN Conference for the
Intern ational Sale of Goods, Articl e 55), or decline to enforce th e contract en tirely?
17. See, e.g., Goetz and Scott, Ayres and Gertner, Craswell, the USC Interdisciplinary L.J. symposium, and
too many others to list. [String cite to be provided]
18. To illustra te, the implied war ranty of merchant ability provides a default rule regarding product quality
in cases where the seller is a merchant; absent contrary agreement, the goods are supposed be of a quality
that would pass without objection in the tra de, be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used, and the like. Un der UCC §§2–314, h owever, the definition of merchantability turns on the nature
of the goods the parties understand themselves to be exchanging; and under UCC 2-316, the
merchantability warran ty can be disclaim ed by a conspicuous writin g mention ing th e word
“merchantability,” by the buyer’s inspection of the goods, by course of dealing, cour se of performance,
or usage of trade, or by an expression such as “as is” that “in common understanding calls th e buyer’s
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty."
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interpretation could in principle be either forma l or substan tive 19 . On this last
question, the default rule literature has had little to say.20
In the last several years, however, a numbe r of econo mically influenced scholars
have turned th eir attention to th e general issue of form versus substance , and in
translating some of the traditional argum ents over this issue into economic language,
have helped to clarify some of the traditional commentators' concerns.21 In the field
of contracts in p articular, this has resulted in somewhat of a renaissance of formalist
arguments — o r what one com mentator has called "anti-anti-formalism." 22
The most prominent of the new wave of contractual formalists is perhaps Lisa
Bernstein, who, in a series of articles detailing the practices of contracting pa rties in
a variety of specialized markets (including the diamond, grain, and cotton trades), has
argued that buyers and sellers w ho deal regularly in a given m arket pre fer to ha ve
their disputes governed by the private rules and procedures supplied by their
individual trade organizations in large part because those rules and procedures are
more formalistic, and thus provide more certainty and protection at lower cost, than
those that would be applied by generalist courts applying the UCC.23 But other
stalwarts of the econom ic approac h to contrac t law, includ ing Robert Sc ott and Alan

19. The UCC, of course, makes plain that the inquiry is to be a substantive one. See various provisions and
official comments, including 1-201(3) on the definition of "agreement."
20. See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meanin g Rule, and the Principles of Contractual
Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 533 (1998) [herein after E. Posn er, The Parol Eviden ce Rule]
(critiquing the default -rul e liter atur e on this basis) . But see Ayres and Ger tner's discussion of tai lored
vs untailored default rules, discussed supra, note x.
21. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992)
[her einafter Ka plow, Rules Ver sus Sta ndards]; Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optima l Complexit y of
Legal Rules, 11 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 150. (1995 ) [herein after Kaplow, Optimal Complexity of Legal
Rules].
22. David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 842 (1999)
23. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: a
Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1999); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the
Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724
(2001).
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Schwartz, have also join ed the form alist bandw agon (or perh aps have be en driving
it all along). Scott in particular has been arguing for some years when government
lawmakers attempt to develop complex substantive regulations or default rules, or
when they look deeply into context when engaging in interpretive inquiries, they
discou rage private actors fro m developin g their own arrangemen ts for dealing w ith
the underly ing transaction al problem. Because state lawma kers can only operate at
a general level, while private solutions to transactional problems are likely to be better
tailored to the needs of individual contracting parties, Scott concludes that clear and
simple interpre tive rules are best, even if on their face they appear to direct less than
efficient outcomes. 24 More recently, both Scott and Schwartz, drawing on work in the
econom ic theory of in complete contracts, have argued that many common contractual
devices are designed as responses to the fact that generalist courts cannot effectively
(that is, at reasona ble cost and with reasonable a ccuracy) d etermine the facts
necessary to enforce th e parties' substan tive bargain as the y ideally w ould wish it to
be enforced in a world of full and free information. For courts to ignore these
limitations and to try to enforce contracts as if they operated in a full-information
world, they argue, d isserves the par ties' bargain and reduces the expected value of
their exchange.25
The arguments of these new economic formalists have not gone unchallenged.
With regard to lawmaking in general, Louis Kaplow has shown using a formal
decision-the oretic model that the optimal choice between rules and standards, and the
optimal level of complexity of legal rules, depends upon empirical considerations
such as the relative cost of ex ante and ex post decisionmaking, the costs of

24. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261 (1985); Robert E. Scott, A Relational
Theory of Secured Financing 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (1986); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Th eory of
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 597 (1990)
25. Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts and the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Contracts and Judicial
Strategies, 21 J. Legal Stud. 271 (1992); Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Con tracts, 2 New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics and Law 277 (1997); Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational
Contract, 94 Nw. U.L. Rev. 847 (2000). See also work by Victor Goldberg, Gillian Hadfield, Benjamin
Klein, and others. [strng site to be provided]
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information acquisition, and the probability that a dispute will arise.26 While limits
on judicial competence do provide a reason to follow simple rules, in general one
cannot conclude that rules dominate standards or that simplicity dominates
complexity for all or even most pu rposes. In the fie ld of contrac ts in particular, E ric
Posner has defended a more balanced view of forma l and su bstantive approach es to
interpretation, suggesting that under some circumstances — especially those in which
the contracting parties are boundedly rational, endowed with asymmetric information,
or following a suboptimal convention — courts can improve social welfare by
pursuing a liberal interpretive approach.27 Posner has also pointed out that even were
we to make the extreme assumption that courts w ere comple tely unable to determine
the contracting pa rties intentions o r the underly ing facts of a co ntractual disp ute, it
would still not necessarily follow that courts should take a passive or literal approach
to interpretation. Under some circumstances, he suggests, even incompete nt courts
could promote cooperation and deter oppor tunism b y provid ing a means whereby an
aggrieved party could credibly invoke a mutual penalty. Increasing the complexity
of legal proceedings, on this view, serves to increase the size of this th reat, even if it
does little to improve the accuracy of the result in those cases that actually go to
trial. 28
From the standpoint of the goal of clarification, the new economic analysis of
formalism has been relatively successful in relating the traditional debates over
formalism to specific transactional and institutional problems such as imperfect
information, risk allocation, rent-seeking and bounded rationality. Where the recent
commentary has fallen short, however, is along the dimension of advancing toward
practical responses to the form/substance dilemma.

26. See Kaplow, supra, note x.
27. E. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra, note x; Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, and Richard
Zeckhauser, The Design an d Interpr etation of Contracts: Wh y Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev.
91 (2000);
28. Eric Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev.
749 (2000) [hereinafter E. Posner, Radical Judicial Error] .
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This is so for two reasons. First, because the difference between the formalist and
anti-formalist positions is a matter of degree rather than kind, resolving their
arguments comes down in practice to line-d rawing. Even ar dent ne o-forma lists like
Bernstein or Scott agree that courts should depa rt from formalist methodo logy in
certain circumstances — for instance, when there has been a credible allegation of
fraud or error in transcription. (Just as courts following the relatively formalist First
Restatement version of the parol evidence rule made exception for cases of fraud and
mistake.) Conversely, even advocates of a more liberal interpretive approach
acknow ledge that their position demands that co urts or other law-applying actors
possess at least minimal interpretive competence. But the proper compromise
between form and substance, if it is to be based on utilitarian considerations, depends
on an empiric al judgment, made over the universe of potential cases, of how the
relevant informational and transactional factors balance out. The very limitations of
rationality and information that lead neo-formalists to conclude that courts should not
engage in substantive in terpretation and that legislatures should not enact vague
standards that require a substantive application also prevent us from drawing th e
proper limits between formal and substantive approaches with any confidence. To
put it conversely, if sta te actors know enough to set the appropriate boundaries on
formalism, they are already significantly alon g the way to being able to do aw ay with
formalism entirely. Absent such knowledge, the setting of boundaries — like the
application of subs tantive interpretation in any given case — is a matter o f guessw ork.
Second, as Schwartz a nd Scott have s hown in their influential work on the political
economy of the American Law Institute (and scholars in the field of positive political
theory have shown generally), legislative bodies that are charged with the
promulgation of generally ap plicable regulations an d that are also institutionally
responsible to a diverse set of interest groups will tend to favor standards over rules
and vagueness over simplicity.29 The positive imperatives of lawmaking thus lead
naturally to interpretive conventions that disfavor formalist decision making. This
phenomenon may be somewhat less pronounced for common-law courts, perhaps due

29. Alan Sch wartz an d Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legi slatures, 143 U Pa L Rev 595
(1995)
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to the influence of interjurisdictional competition and litigant initiative, but even so
the process of common-law development, with its continual generation of exceptions
and counter-principles, can erod e the clarity and simplicity of legal doctrine. In a
federalist legal system in which the choice between formal and substantive
approaches can be made at a local level, furthermore, different jurisdictions may
adopt different interpretive stances for reasons of their own.
B. An alternate perspective: private ordering over form and substance
Given that new e conomic a nalysis of formalism does not offer clear policy
prescriptions for governmental reformers, or an operational program for implementing
such prescriptions, what is the next move? In this essay, I propose a different
approach: one that focuses on private legal decisionmakers as the primary audience,
rather than public ones. Note in this regard that virtually all of the above-mentioned
commentators direct the bu lk of their advice to governmental or quasi-governmental
officials, even — indeed, es pecially — neoformalists like Schwartz and Scott. The
advice may be that state actors should keep their hands off private contractual
arrangemen ts and restrict themselves to the relatively mechanical task of applying
formal rules, but it is advice to state actors nonetheless. There are some exceptions
to this blanket statement: Bernstein, for instance, in her articles on private commercial
law regimes, focu ses in her explicit dis cussions o n a largely po sitive analysis, an d is
content to leave her normative critique of the UC C's interpretive ap proach as implicit.
Posner also spends a significant amount of time in his artic les discussing th e likely
responses of private actors to the various interpretive policies that courts and
legislatures might ad opt. 30 But this discussion — which he calls a po sitive analysis
rather than a normative on e — op erates in the o verall context o f his analysis m erely
as an instrument that he uses to d evelop guiding principles for government

30. Cite to specific discussions in Eric Posner, supra note x.
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lawmakers.31 He does not consider, except incidentally, the possibility that his
analysis could be useful to private actors.32
As I have argued elsewhere, the almost-exclusive focus in the mainstream law-andeconomics literature on a hypothetical audience of public lawmakers constitutes a
severe misallocation of intellectual resources.33 Even if we thought the relevant
officials were inclined to take our advice, and even if we thought they had sufficient
ability and incen tive to apply tha t advice fruitfully to actual policy and legal
questions, we would still be ignoring the entire population of potential private
lawmakers and neglecting the possibility that their efforts could also contribute to an
increase in social welfare. Unless one thinks that private incentives for lawmaking
are necessarily at odds with the pu blic interest, or th at private lawmakers' theoretical
and practical know ledge already provides them with a fully adequate basis for
enlightened lawmaking — or, more threateningly to our scholarly self-esteem, that
private lawmakers would be even less inclined to pay attention to our writings than
public ones — this failure to address their perspective do es not make e conomic
sense. It seems unlikely that the marginal contracts article addressed to courts or
legislators, on top of all such articles that have been written and published over the
past decades, would have higher value added than an article or two foc used on b asic
principles of transactional efficiency, and directed toward a hypothetical audience of
private contract lawyers. 34 Moreo ver, the detailed information th at is necessar y to
implement these principles intelligently is much likelier to be available at the
individual level than at the level of the system as a whole. Private lawmakers may
thus be in a significantly better position to make p ractical use o f the econo mic
analysis of contracts than public ones.

31. Id.
32. Id at __ (observing, as an aside, that heterogeneity among contracting parties implies that they should
be permitted the freedom to choose ex ante between formal and substantive interpretive regimes of law.)
33. [Citation omitted to preserve anonymity of submission process.]
34. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pri cing, 94 Yale L.J.
239–313 (1984)
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The value of refocusing attention on plan ning problem s faced by private
lawmakers, I think, is even greater with regard to basic problems of interpretation of
the sort studied in the first-year c ontracts class. Most of the scholarly literature in the
area is court- and case-centered, and thus tends to emphasize the aspects of
interpretation that are central to the subjective experience of courts when deciding
disputes. But as we know , many more con tracts are written than are litigated, and the
majority of our students that practice contract or commercial law will practice on the
transactional side. Few of them will be judges or legislators, most of them will never
be in a position to persuade a judge or legislature to change the law, but all of them
might benefit from a clearer understanding of the practical consequences of formal
and substantive interpretive strategies.
Taking a transactional approach to the problem of form and substance also helps
emphasize the fact that, for all the discretion that courts and other arbiters may ha ve
with regard to interpretive questions, there are things that contracting parties can do
ex ante to increase th e chance s that interpretin g actors will follow the contractors'
wishes ex post. For instanc e, if the parties want to limit courts’ investigations into the
history of their negotiatio ns, they ca n and often do put a m erger clause in to their
written contract, statin g that the writing e xpresses th eir entire agreeme nt and that a ll
prior understandings or agreements have been merged into it. Such a clause will not
serve as an absolute guarantee that the agreement will be enforced as written, bu t it
does make a differe nce. W hile courts still retain the power to ignore merger clauses
if they conclude that circumstances warrant, the use of the clause still tends as a
practical matter to discourage courts from engaging in more free-form styles of
interpretation, which is w hy contrac ting parties continue to use them eve n in
jurisdictions that take a liberal approach to the adm ission of parol evidence.
There are, in fact, m any opp ortunities for contracting parties to choose between
relatively formal and relatively substan tive interpretive regimes , and to ha ve their
choices matter; the merger clause is just one prominent example. No-oral
modification clauses provide another: parties to sales transactions can provide,
pursuant to UCC §2-209, that any modifications to their contract must be in writing.
While such clauses do not prevent courts from using the equitable doctrines of waiver

Form an d Subs tance in C ontract In terpretation

Draft, 3/10/03, p. 15

or estoppel to find that the contract has been varied, they still reduce the likelihood
of such a finding, and it is possible to add additional clauses to the original writing
that discourage the assertion of such claim s. (Similarly, while the common law of
contracts does not re cognize no -oral-modification clauses as an official formal device,
the presence of such a clause certainly raises the bar of persuasion for anyone who
subsequently tries to claim that a con tract has been so mod ified).
Anothe r comm on wa y for the parties to choos e amon g interpre tive regimes is by
choosing which jurisdiction's law s govern the co ntract, since jurisdictions can vary
considerab ly in their level of formalism. Virginia and Texas, for instance, continue
to follow a traditionally strict version of the parol evidence rule, while California and
New Jersey are fa mous for takin g more liberal a pproaches.35 New York and
Connecticut continue to take different positions with regard to the formal
effectiveness of an accord and satisfaction executed by check, even though the
question is ostensibly governed by a uniform statute.36 In the area of international
sales, the UC C, how ever anti-forma list it may seem w hen com pared to the traditional
common law, is in many ways more formal than the alternative regime provided by
the UN Conventio n on the Intern ational Sale of G oods, w hich rejects both the Statu te
of Frauds and the parol evidence rule.37 Choice-of-law clauses are common in
commercial contracts, and while policy considerations such as consumer protection
place some limits on their enforcement, at least in the commercial setting they are

35. For a survey of case law comparing common-law jurisdictions taking liberal and strict approaches to the
parol evidence rule, see Scott, The Uniformity Norm, supra note x, at x .
36. Compare Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., Inc.,66 N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 56,
497 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1985) ( holdin g that t he common-l aw doctrine of accord and satisfaction h as been
superceded by provisions of UCC 1-207) with County Fire Door Corp. v. C.F. Wooding Co.,202 Conn.
277, 520 A.2d 1028 (1987) (holding that 1-207 does not apply to accord and satisfaction). The
subsequent revision of 1-207 adopted the Connecticut approach, but New York, in contr ast to most oth er
states, has not adopted this revision.
37. On the other h and, in the area of offer and acceptance the CISG' s rules are more formalistic than the
UCC's. Compare §§2-204 [indicating that a contract for sale of goods can be made in "any manner
sufficient to show agreement"] and 2-206 ["an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting
acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances;"] to CISG Articles 14
through 24 [creating elaborate framework of rules relatin g to offers, acceptances, counteroffers,
rejections, and retractions].
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usually implemented as written.38 While there are many reasons for the parties to
choose to be governed by a given legal regime, procedural simplicity and the ease of
resolving disputes is a c ommon m otivation, and in that regard the level of formalism
is an important factor.
Similarly, parties can often specify the forum in which contractual disputes will be
heard, either by sp ecifying a partic ular location w here any litigation must be bro ught,
or, as incre asingly c ommo n, by p roviding ex ante for private arbitration. Even if the
substan tive law to be applied to the contract is ostensibly the same, trib unals in
different locations may be more o r less inclined to delve into contextual matters, due
to differences in jurisprudential approach, local legal culture, procedural and
evidentiary rules, case loads, or other resou rce constraints. Private arbitrators are
subject to similar variations, and face further in centives t o forma lize their i nterpre tive
practices in order to low er the cost of th eir proceedings, guard against suspicions of
partiality, limit their exposure to judicial supervision, and attract future business.39
Like choice-of-law clauses, fo rum-selection and arbitration clauses a re not always
enforced strictly according to their terms, and may be disregarded by courts willing
to look beyond the face o f the clause for interpretive evidence, or to override the
clause in favor of some countervailing policy or principle.40 But such clauses do
receive some weight in practice; many courts enforce them presumptively; and there
are self-interested reasons for even anti-formalist courts to defer to them. Parties who
favor a more formal interpretive approach, accordingly, h ave significant leew ay to

38. See Erin O'Ha ra, Optin g out of Regu lati on: a Public Choice Analysis of Con tractual Choice of Law,
53 Vand. L. Rev. 1551, xx-xx (2000).
39. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial La w in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001); compare St ephen J. Wa re, Default Rules
From Mandatory Rules: Privatizin g Law Throug h Arbitr ation, 8 3 Minn . L. Rev. 703 (1999); Andr ew
Guzman, Arbit rator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 Duke L.J. 1279 (2000)
[both emphasizing difficulty that courts face in ensuring that arbitrators apply substantive legal rules in
the same way that courts would.]
40. Cite here cases that invalidate forum-selection and arbitration clauses on unconscionability or adhesioncontract grounds; also state statutes that limit the scope for forum selection (especially in response to the
UCITA controversy) [Citations to be provided.]
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choose to have their disputes heard by tribunals who share their philosophy (as
Bernstein's discussions of private trade tribunals suggest.)
Contracting parties also ma y opt in to a form alist interp retive regim e by us ing a
stereotypical legal device such as a negotiable instrument or letter of credit. Such
commercial specialties are governed by distinct bodies o f law, descending in part
from the law merchant, that reflect a more formalist jurisprudential philosophy than
does the common law of contracts generally. A holder in due course of a negotiab le
instrument, for instance, is entitled to enforce the instrument against its maker or
indorser even if the defendant would have a good defense to liability on the
underlying contractual obligation.41 Similarly, the liability of the issuer of a letter of
credit depends solely on w hether the b eneficiary p resents doc uments that comply
facially with the pa yment con ditions provide d in the letter. The issuer need not (and
indeed, is not authorized to) inquire into the truth of any representations contained in
the presenting documents, and is entitled to demand strict compliance with all
payment conditions, in marked contrast to the more liberal rule of substantial
compliance that would be impo sed under the ordinary law of contracts.42 While
commercial parties may have a variety of reasons fo r choosing to use one of these
specialized devices, one important reason is the desire to con tract into a more
formalistic interpretive regime. A prominen t illustration is provid ed by the ris e in
popularity of the stand by letter of cre dit, which in econom ic terms is a clos e substitute
for the common-law suretyship or guaranty, but which in legal terms is governed by
a substantially more formalistic body o f legal doctrine.43 Experts in th e field

41. UCC 3-305(b). The HDC's rights ar e subject to the so-called "real" defenses, which include infa ncy,
duress, illegalit y, lack of ca pacit y, disch arge in bankr uptcy, or essential fraud, but not subject to ordinary
defenses such as mistake, misrepresentation, or failure of condition.
42. Compare UCC 5-108 with Restatement (Second) of Contracts §357; see also UCC 5-108, comment 1.
43. See Peter A. Alces, An Essay on Independence, Interdependence, and the Suret yship Prin ciple, 1993 U
Ill L Rev 447, 465-76 (discussing and compa ring d efenses under Arti cle 5 an d the common law). For
specific examples, consider UCC § 5-102(a)(7) [defining good faith as mere "honesty in fact," in contrast
to the more equitable standard of "rea sonabl e commer cial standards of fair deali ng" found in Section
2-103(1)(b)], UCC § 5-108(a), [substituti ng a str ict complian ce principle for the doctrines of waiver and
estoppel that would otherwise apply under Section 1-103]; UCC § 5-111(a) [eliminating consequential
damages and, more strikingly, the duty to mitigate damages]; and UCC § 5-111(e) [providing that courts
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common ly assert that it is this very formalism w hich makes th e standby credit an
attractive commercial alternative.44
Finally, contracting parties can often implement a more formal interpre tive regime
with regard to particular aspects o f their agreemen t through the u se of specific
stipulations. The most familiar case of such a stipulation is the standard liquidated
damage clause. By liquidating damages in their initial agreement, parties reduce the
likelihood that a court will engage in an substantive inquiry into the actual state of
damages ex post. A re duced likeliho od is not a guarantee, o f course, sin ce courts w ill
still supervise a liquidated damages clause to ensure that it does not wo rk a penalty,
and some courts remain resistant to the use of liquidated damages in cases where
damages are amenable to ex p ost calculation. But by adopting such a clause, the
parties do buy th emselves som ewhat grea ter formality, an d in practice perhaps a
presumption of enforceability. Similar stipulations regarding other terms of the
agreement h ave an analo gous effect. 45
Because there are so many ways for contracting parties to influence the inter pretive
regime under which the ir agreements will be enforced, the existing literature’s
emphasis on advising public lawmakers whether to restrict or liberalize the ir
interpre tive approach is to an significant extent be side the point. The in terpretive
regime should be understood as a sort of default rule, which parties can opt out of
with careful planning. Different parties, depending on their circumstances, will prefer
different tradeoffs between form and substance, and helping the parties to choose the
correct balance in th is regard is one of the main tasks the transactional lawyer faces.

must award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in any dispute that arises over the issuer's duty to pay].
44. See Henry Har field, Guar anties, St andby Letters of Credit, and Ugly Ducklings, 26 UCC L J 195, 196
n 2 (1994); Peter A. Alces, An Essay on Independence, Interdependence, and the Suret yship Prin ciple,
1993 U Ill L Rev 447, 450-52; Rufus James Trimble, The Law Merchant and the Letter of Credit, 61
Harv L Rev 981, 1006 (1948).
45. See, e.g., UCC 1-102(3), which pr ovides that a lthough duties of good faith, reasonablen ess, diligen ce
and care can not be di sclaimed entirely, the par ties can by stipulation deter mine th e standar ds by which
those duties are to be measured, so long as such stan dards are not "m anifestly un reasonable." Th e upshot
is that courts retain t he power to supervise the parties' stipulations, but parties can through careful
plann ing make it less likel y that their choices will be second-guessed in practice.
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Judicial formalism ma y wax a nd wan e, but this plan ning problem will remain
important for lawyers and for their clients.
C. Motivation for the analysis to follow
What is needed, accordingly, and what the economic analysis of contracts can
provide, is a basic taxonomy of substantive considerations that can serve as an
organizing framew ork for pa rties cho osing between form and substance when
designing contracts. A good commercial lawyer needs to understand the functional
underp innings of the transac tion in order to help plan it — and in commercial
settings, these underpinnings are economic. I am not claiming that actual
transactional attorneys do not take such considerations into account — of course they
do; a working fam iliarity with such factors is one of their main stoc ks in trade. But
organizing such insights in to a more sy stematic con ceptual fram ework help s us to
integrate and synthesize disparate bodies of practical knowledge relating to various
commercial and legal fields: negotiable instruments, letters of credit, choice of law,
sales, and so on . Such a syn thesis enab les insights from one field to be translated and
analogized for the purposes of critiquing and improvi ng transaction al planning in
others. Additionally, it serves an important pedagogical function in the training of
law students, because young law yers beginnin g legal practice w ill be able to
assimilate convention al wisdom more quickly and effectively if they are first
equipped with its implicit theoretical underpinnings.
In the succeeding sections of this essay, therefore, I turn to the question of when
and why co ntracting parties should choose formal methods of interpretation over
substan tive ones, or vice versa. My analysis thus will implicate questions such as
whether the parties sho uld write a merger claus e into their agreement or whether the
parties should opt into Virginia law, ra ther than questions such a s whether a court
should admit a given item of parol evidence, or change its doctrines so as more
closely to resemble Virginia law. Of course, if we are able to develop a framework
for answerin g the former se t of question s, that will likely he lp courts to answer the
latter set of questions as well, and possibly to ask those questions differently. Instead
of asking what substantive terms the parties intended to have in their agre ement,
courts might begin to ask what interpretative method the parties wished to have.
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A model of the choice between form and substance.

A. Normative considerations
In this section I set o ut my operational definitions of form and substance in the
interpre tive context, as well as the normative goals that my framewo rk is designed to
pursue. The latter ques tion is more q uickly addre ssed. This essay is inten ded to
follow in the tradition of functionalist accoun ts of formalism such as that of Lon
Fuller. 46 But because I am focusing on those functional considerations that are most
relevant to decision-making by contracting parties at the planning stage, my ana lysis
is limited almost exclusively to issues of economic efficiency . Specifically, I
concentra te on the question what administrative arrangements will maximize the total
expected value of the underlying exchange, with adjustments for risk aversion but not
for distribution or procedural fairness (except inso far as the partie s are willing to
sacrifice exchange value in order to p romote such other goals.)
I defend this focus on pragmatic ground s that are stand ard in the ec onomic
literature on contracts; most importantly for reasons of brevity and specialization of
scholarly effort. The normative appeal of the efficiency criterion has been thoro ughly
discussed by other scholars (indeed, there has been a recent resurgence of debate over
the criterion) and I have nothing to add to this discussion at present. Justifying the
efficiency cr iterion as a ma tter of fundam ental principle is beyond the scope o f this
essay, and the usual admonitions will apply. 47 Second, this essay attemp ts in
particular to develop gen eral principles that can be u sed to furthe r the aims of p rivate

46. Fuller, Consideration and Form, supra n ote x.
47. For more gener al discussions of the efficiency criterion, see Jules Coleman, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE
LAW (1988), ch.4 ; Richard Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983), ch s.3 and 4; and the arti cles
appearing in Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485–770 (1980), More
specifically, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD . 667 , argue that even if dist ribution al equity is an
important social objective, it is more effectively promoted by using dir ect public instruments such as tax
and transfer paymen ts, r ather th an throu gh th e rules of private la w.
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contracting parties. Such parties, especially those op erating in the commercial
context, generally enga ge in exchan ge for instrume ntal purpos es, whic h typically
include the goal of material profit. Any analysis that did not give a central place to
maximizing co ntractual value would not address these needs. Third, as long as the
transaction in question is an arms–length one, the parties have the option not to enter
into it, and they are informed of the re levant bu siness ris ks and legal consequences,
there are no clear distributional consequences flowing from any change in legal
rules.48 As a general matter, the surplus from exchange tends to be divided among
contracting parties in proportion to their relative eagerness to enter into the bargain.
Any efficiency gains or losses resulting from a c hange in regime , accordingly , will
tend to be shared.49
In the bulk of this essay, furthermore, I also treat the interests of the contracting
parties as paramount. This approach is equivalent to assuming that there are no
important third -party effects attac hing t o the principa l parties’ deci sion s. If there are
such third-party effe cts, then w e can stipula te that from an efficiency standpoint
courts and other public officials ought to watch out for them , and ough t to refuse to
give effect to any contractual provisions — including those that deal with the
form/substance issue — that impose n egative externalities . Similarly, a com plete
analysis of any policy issue in contract or commerc ial law wo uld obvious ly have to
include consideration of potential market and contractual failures (such as monop oly
power, bounde d rationality an d imperfect in formation) th at would justify overriding
the parties' contractual freedom, but in this essay I will put aside such problems, for
reasons generally analogo us to those I have given above for ignoring issues of
distribution.50

48. The doctrine of silence as acceptance, discussed in Katz, supra, note 7, is an exception to this statement
because the doctri ne influen ces the cost of declinin g an exchange.
49. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller
Relationships, 43 STAN . L. REV. 361–398 (1991).
50. For an excellent (and perhaps definitive) general discussion of such problems, see generally Michael J.
Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (1993).
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It is worth making one last prefatory remark regarding the relevance to m y analysis
of the liberal nor m of person al autonom y. Some co ntracts scholars, including Randy
Barnett, have argued in favor of formalist modes of interpretation on grounds of
autonomy, reasoning that clear and pred ictable rules h elp to facilitate the free exercise
of individual will, and operate as a safeguard aga inst state agents illegitima tely
infringing on individual choice.51 Other autonomy theorists, such as Charles Fried,
have instead claimed that deference to parties’ freely exercised choices may
sometimes require courts to pay closer substantive attention to what choices the
parties actually intended to exercise.52 I take no position on this controversy, and
indeed have little to say ab out autono my. It does seem to me, how ever, that a
principled liberal should be in favo r of allowin g people en tering into contra cts to
choose between formal and substantive modes of contractual interpretation, based on
what seem to them to be good and sufficient reasons, unless there is some reason such
as force or fraud that justifies overriding the parties’ will. In this regard , my goals
here are co nsistent with those of a liberal or libertarian, in that I focus on clarifying
the considerations that would be relevant to such a choice in the individual case. To
the extent that the parties’ deliberations are well-considered, that offers greater
support for respecting their decisions; and so to the extent that my analysis fosters
better private decisionmaking, it also forwards liberal values.53

51. Randy E, Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1986); Randy E. Barnett The
Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contr actual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821 (1992). See also Ern est
Weinrib’s more general autonomy-based defense of formalism [citations to be provided]; cf. G. Brennan
& J. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules (1985).
52. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (1981), at __.
53. Compare in this regard the normative traditional of corrective justice, which in some of its versions might
be thoug ht to suggest that mor al or legal wrongs need t o be substantively righted regardless of the wishes
and intent ions of the victim , and th at this obligation i s inali enable. While my efficiency-oriented
approach is compatible and even con sonant with t he autonomy norm, it con flicts with t he correcti ve
justice approach to this extent. See generally Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, supra note
x.
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B. A descriptive model
With these normative preliminaries out of the wa y, we are now in a position to turn
to the main analysis. There are numerous accounts of the distinction between form
and substance in the schola rly literature.54 One sees the dichotomy expressed in terms
of rules versus standards, rules versus discretion, textual versus contextual modes of
interpretation, static versus dynamic interpretation, simplicity versus complexity,
determinacy versus flexibility, objective versus subjec tive standards, and so on. Each
of these o ppose d pairs h ighlights different functional aspects of the formalism
problem, but what they have in common is that the first member o f each opp osed pair
connotes an interpretive approach that focuses on a more limited set of au thoritative
or evidentiary materials, and the second member connotes an approach that embraces
or allows for the consideration of a more expansive set of materials. A rule-based
theory of interpretation, for instance, directs the interpreter to limit his or her attention
to the specific considerations set out by the lawmaker at the time that the rule was
promulgated, while a standard-base d theory allows the interpreter also to consider
factors that may no t become a pparent un til the moment that law is applied to facts.55
Similarly, an objective standard o f interpretation directs the inter preter to limit
attention to factors that would be accessible to all individuals who can be categorized
as being in the relevant agent’s position (with the category being defined widely or
narrowly depending on the prescriptions of the stan dard), w hile a su bjective
interpre tive standard directs the interpreter additionally to consider factors that might
be accessib le only to the individual partie s to the contra ct. 56
Following this general distin ction, accordingly, in this essay I will model the
concept of formality as a function of the set of materials that an interpreter considers
54. See, e.g ., Duncan Kenn edy, Form and Substance i n Private Law Adjudication, also Legal Formality,
Schauer, Playin g by the Rules, Kaplow, Rules versus Standar ds, the Chicago symposium, Eisenberg,,
The Nature of the Common Law, Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, Eskridge, Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, Grey, The New Formalism. [Specific citations to be provided.]
55. See, e.g., Kaplow, Rules versus Standards, supra, note x.
56. See, e.g ., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§10,101 (contrast ing objective and subjective interpr etive
standard s, as well as standards em phasizing th e alterna tive in terpretive positions of speaker and listener).

Form an d Subs tance in C ontract In terpretation

Draft, 3/10/03, p. 24

in arriving at an interpretation. Formalism entails restriction to a smaller set of
decisional materials (for example, the presence or absence of an wa x seal, as it relates
to the enforce ability of a w ritten promise) ; while sub stantive interpreta tion permits
and sometimes directs attention to a larger set of decisional materials (for example,
the underl ying facts of a business relationship, as they relate to the presence or
absence of contractual consideration). I am hoping that this accoun t of formalism w ill
seem both intuitively appealing and familiar; it resembles and draws on, for instance,
the concept o f exclusion ary reason s put forw ard by jurisp rudential w riters such as
Raz and Schauer. 57 In order to highlight th e connec tion of my a pproach with
econom ic analysis in general and decision theory in particular, however, I denote the
set of permissible materials associated with a given interpretive regime as the
regime’s information set, an d mo del the par ties ' choice between formal and
substantive regimes as an ex ante choice of th e information set I.
Note that this definition of formalism can itself fairly be called formalistic, since
it suppresses other factors that some people might consider relevant to an account of
the distinction between form and substance. The defin ition can be interpreted q uite
generally, however, to include most of the issues discussed under the rubric of
formalism by traditiona l scholars of ju risprudenc e. For instan ce, accord ing to this
definition, both traditional legal positivism, which distinguishes between moral and
legal considerations and which claims that only the latter provide an appro priate basis
for legal decisionmaking, and Ronald Dw orkin’s co ntempo rary the ory of ju dging,
which distinguishes b etween c onsideratio ns of policy and of principle and which
claims that only the latter provide an appro priate basis for judic ial decis ionmakin g,
are formalist theories.
On the above definition, it is not possible strictly to rank all interpretive regimes
in order of their formality, since the information sets associated with two regimes may
overlap. For instance, §2-202 of the Uniform Comm ercial Cod e directs cou rts
interpreting an integrated contract to consider trade usage, course of dealing and
course of performance in interpreting the meaning of the contract, but not to consider

57. See Raz, The Authority of Law; Schauer, Playing by the Rules. [Citations to be provided.]
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evidence of prior agreements or contemporaneous oral agreements to the extent that
they are inconsistent with the written contract terms. The standard for determining
inconsistency, however, is not pre scribed ; and ma ny cou rts have applied it liberally.58
This approach is in contrast with the traditional common law, which took a stricter
stand on the admission of parol evidence and did not explicitly confer official status
on course of performance. In this regard, the UCC is less formal. But §2-209(2) also
provides that if th e parties to a sign ed contrac t adopt a no-oral-modification clause,
attempted oral modifications will be ineffective.59 This device was not recognized at
common law, and in this regard the UCC is more formal. Thus, if we are being
absolutely precise , only if th e inform ation se t associa ted with a given regime is
entirely contained within the inform ation set of another regime (i.e., the first
information set is a proper subset of the seco nd) can we say th at the first regime is
strictly more formal than the second. But speaking more casually, it will be useful
to call a regim e relatively formal if i ts inform ation se t is relatively more restricted
than another’s, o r if its information set contains relatively little that is not contained
within the other information set, and omits a significan t amount of material that is
contained within the o ther information set.
While the set-theoretic definition I have given may appear to suggest a bright-line
distinction between formal and substantive modes of interpretation (because under
classical notio ns of set theo ry a given eleme nt either is or is no t a member of a set),
it can also be understood in probabilistic terms. Some regimes — indeed, p robably
most — may admit certain types of material into their permissible information set, but
only some of the time, or only for limited purposes, or with less weight, or only if the
material is weighty enough to overcome a presumption against admissibility.
Accordingly, a regime that allo ws the co nsideration o f more interpretive material
more of the time or with greater probability is more formalistic, other things being
equal, than a regime that uses such material less of the time or with lower probability.

58. In the spirit of official comment 3, which appears to suggest a presumption of consistency: “If the
additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the document
in the view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact.”
59. Although under 2-209(4) they may depending on circumstances operate as a waiver.
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Similarly, a regime that establishes a hierarc hy of influe nce and th at treats certain
types of material as more weighty or mo re privileged than others is more form alistic
than one that accords all types of material equal consideration. To illustrate, under
the Second Restatement's approach to the parol evidence rule, the court may consider
parol evidence for the purpose of deciding whether the written contract is an
integrated one or not. If the court decides on the basis of the evidence that the writing
is an integration, then the parol evide nce is not su pposed to be used to interpret the
writing further, and must be withheld from the trier of fact. Similarly, under §2-208
of the UCC , factfinders a re directed to interpret trade usage, course of dealing, course
of performan ce, and ex press contra ctual terms as c onsistent w ith one anoth er if they
can reason ably be ar such a readin g, if they c annot, expres s terms a re to take
precedence over the other categories of m aterial, c ourse o f perfor mance is to take
precedence over trade usage and course of dealin g, and co urse of d ealing is to take
precedence over trade usage.
It is important to note that the information set associa ted with a given inte rpretive
regime is not the same thing as the information set that is actually used by any
particular interpretive agent w ithin that regime w hen ma king an inte rpretive
determination — and similarly, that this la tter information set Ia (call it the agentspecific informatio n set for individual agent a) may vary among agents within the
same regime. In this case, the effective formality of a regime will depend on the
distribution of information sets across all agents within it, and as such must be
understood in statistical terms.
For exam ple, a given regime might permit ind ividual judges to make use of their
experience in previous ca ses when making an interpretive decision, or might allow
courts to take judicial notice of particular facts. Und er that regime, jud ges with
different backgrounds or levels of expe rience wo uld have diffe rent agent-spe cific
information sets available when making their decisions. A regime that prohibited
judges from considering this sort of background info rmation w ould make th eir
individual agent-specific information sets more similar. If we compare the
information available to jud ges to the information available to contracting parties,
however, a ban on judicial notice could make the expected information set, as
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averaged over the set of all judges, either more or less similar to the expected
information set, as averaged over the set of all contracting parties. The direction of
the outcome would then depend on how much the experience of judges overlapped
with the experience o f contracting parties.
Accordingly, the effective de gree of formalism achieved by the regime sho uld be
understood as a function of its agent-specific information sets, each of which a re
themselves functions of the regime's general information set.
In order to be as precise as possible about what is being assumed, it is useful to
represent the foregoing conceptual model in mathematical notation as follows: first,
each interpretive agent combines his or her agent-specific information set Ia with the
contractual information s et I, using a particular aggregation function G ( I, Ia ).
Second, the agen t applies some d ecision rule D( •) to the res ulting aggre gated
information. Third, this same process is carried out by all types of agents, so that the
ex ante expected outcome from the viewpoint of the contracting parties can be written
as

ma

D (G (I, Ia )) f(a) da

where f(a) represents the probability distribution of agents of type a.
Note that the expected outcome depends not just on the distribution of agent types,
but also on the aggregation function G (•) and the decision rule D (•). For instance,
if the agent simply combined all of the informatio n in her agen t-specific set Ia with
the information s pecified in the contractua l set I, and used all of the inform ation with
equal weight, then G would correspond to the union function ² (I, Ia ). Conversely,
if the agent only used information that is within her own set as well as in the
contractual set, then G would correspond the intersection function ³ (I, Ia ). We
could further generalize the analysis by supposing that each individual agent a used
an individualized decision rule D a (•) (so that, for instance, some agents could pursue
what they saw as the parties' intentions, others could pursue what they saw as
econom ic efficiency, a nd still others what they saw as distributional justice). The
above specification, accordingly, is general enough to encompass various types of
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interpre tive approaches and agency problems. This discussion implies, therefore, that
the parties' optimal choice of the contractual information set I will thus depend on the
precise content of the functions G (•) and D (•).
The formal specification of the model also makes clear that within this theoretical
framew ork, contracting parties can opt into a more formal interpretive regime in two
ways: first, by placing limits on the overall information set permitted by the regime
(for example, by exc luding parol evidence or evidence o f oral modifications), and
second, by limiting the set of eligible interpretive agents (for example, with a choiceof-forum or arbitration clause.)
C. The contextualist argument
This way of framing the problem helps to clarify and rebut a common argument
against using formal methods of interpre tation, to the effect that all interpretation
depends upon a commo n basis o f contex tual know ledge be tween speaker and
audience and that formalism mistakenly supposes that this is not the case. The
argument typically goes as follows: as a matter of social practice, words have no fixed
or plain meaning, and communications are not self-ex ecuting. A tribu nal faced w ith
a communicative text of potentially legal significance must alw ays ma ke a contextual
interpretation, based on its experience, on its stereotypes about parties such as these
and their likely purposes, and on the linguistic conventions it regularly participates
in and that it thinks the parties participate in. As the legal-and-literary critic Stanley
Fish has put its, “you can ne ver not be in a context.” 60 Accordingly, if the tribunal
interprets a contract formally — that is, without fully inquiring into the actual context
out of which it arose, there is n o guarantee th at it will apply the contract as the parties
subjectively intended. The parties may have meant “chicken” to mean “broiler
chicken,” they may have mean t “minimum quantity” to mean “at bu yer’s option,”

60. From Is There A Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (1980), at x. See also
Stanley E. Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the
Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes without Saying, and Other Special Cases, 4 Critical Inquiry 625
(1978) ("A sentence is never not in a context, We are never not in a situation. . . A set of in terpretive
assumptions is always in force. A sentence that seems to need no interpretation is already th e product
of one.").
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they may even have intended “buy” to mean “sell”; and one can ’t know for sure
without inquiring. If the court doesn’t inq uire, it is interpreting by its own lights, not
the parties’. The choice for the court, therefore, is not whe ther to rely on context and
substance, but which context and substance to rely on: the parties’, or its own.
This argument — call it the contextua list argume nt — has been very influential in
the contracts literatu re in the last fifty years; its advocates have included such
luminaries as Wigmore 61 , Corbin 62 , and Justice Trayno r.63 In its claim that all
interpretation requires som e context, it seems plainly right. Where the argument goes
wron g, however, is in assuming that this claim, together with the goal of carrying out
the parties’ intentions, commits one to a substantive approach to interpretation,
because this conclusion does not follow. As Eric Posner has observed, the argument

61. The fallacy [of plain meaning] consists in assuming that there is or ever can be some one real or absolute
meaning." 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2462 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). Cited in Steuart v. McChesney, 498 Pa.
45 (1982), at 49.
62. [S]ome of the surrounding cir cumsta nces always must be known before the meaning of the words can
be plain an d clear ; and proof of the circumstances may make a meaning plain and clear when in the
absence of such proof some other meaning may also have seemed plain and clear." 3 Corbin, Contracts
§ 542 (1960). Cited in Steuart v. McChesney, 498 Pa. 45 (1982), at 49. See also Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 212, comment b: "It is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence cannot change the plain
meaning of a writing, but meaning can almost never be plain except in a context. Accordingly, the rule
stated in Subsection (1) is not limited to cases where it is determined that the language used is
ambiguous. Any determination of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the light of the relevant
evidence of the situation and relations of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction, preliminary
negotiations and statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course of dealing between the parties."
63. "A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written instrument to its four-corners
merely because it seems to the court to be clear and unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the
intenti on of the parties or presuppose a degree of ver bal pr ecision and stability our language has n ot
attained." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal . 2d 33, 442 P2
641 (1968). "Wor ds are used in an endless variety of contexts. Their meaning is not subsequently
attached to them by the rea der but is for mula ted by the writer an d can only be found by interpretation in
the light of all the cir cumstan ces that r eveal the sense i n which the writer used the wor ds. The excl usion
of parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because the words do not appear ambiguous to
the reader can easily lead to the attr ibution to a wr itten in strumen t of a meanin g that was never
intended." Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751 (1942) (concurring
opinion);

Form an d Subs tance in C ontract In terpretation

Draft, 3/10/03, p. 30

neglects the pos sibility tha t the part ies can h ave inten tions rega rding how th eir
intentions are to be interpreted.64
Translated into the frame work of ou r model, the contextualist argumen t simply
states that interpretation is always carried out with reference to a particular
information set. A tribunal’s information set is made up of various elem ents
including the judges’ experience and training, the text of the contractual agreement,
as well as any additional ma terial presented by the parties in litigation. Given its
information set, the court can carry out its interpretation with the goal of forwarding
the intentions of th e parties, or it can pursue so me other goa l, such as for warding its
own view of the best social policy . Whate ver goal the cou rt pursues, h owever, it must
make its best guess based on the information available to it (in the way that courts
knowingly make decisions based on limited information when deciding a motion for
summary judgment or judgment on the plea dings). W hile the quality of the guess,
accordingly, depends on the available information set, which information set to use
and which goal to pursue are independent questions. A broad information set can be
used to pursue goals other than the fulfillment of the parties’ intentions; and a narrow
information set can be used to pursue the parties’ intentions, how ever roughly.
This translation into information-theoretic language shows that not only does the
contextualist argument not prove that plain meaning is inc oherent, it actually provides
us with an operational definition of plain meaning — and an economic one at that.
Namely, for a given audience or interpreter, plain meaning corresponds to the
interpretation associated with the interpreter’s ordinary or zero-cost context — that
is, the contex t that the interpreter can apply with m inimal work . Under m ore
substan tive interpretative doctrines, the tribunal deliberately seeks out an augmented
context. Under more formalist interpretive doctrines, the tribunal deliberately
restricts its context. Note that on this definition, what meaning is plain, will be
agen t–sp ecifi c and context– spec ific. If I make a pun or employ irony, for instance,
my plain meaning will be one thing to an audience that catches the irony and another
to one that d oesn’t.

64. E. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra, at _.
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Note also that according to this definition, plain meaning is not the most
formalistic interpretive mode possible. The tribunal can ignore or throw away
information that is part of its ordinary context, as when a court applying
constitutional rules of criminal procedure deliberately excludes evidence that is the
fruit of an illegal search or coerced confession. Because some effort is in volved in
the exclusion, however, it only makes sense to do this if there is some cost associated
with using the excluded in formation.
The same analysis holds, by the way, for all types of interpretation . If I plan to
attend a Shakespearean play, for instance, I could read the play in advance so as not
to miss intricacies of language that would not otherw ise be familiar to me, or I could
just go unprepared and enjoy the play as be st as I can. If I do read th e play in
advance, I could buy th e pocket bo ok version, w hich is chea per and ea sier to carry
around on the subway, or I could at somewhat greater cost buy and read the annotated
edition. I could read the introductory essays in that edition, or not; I could go to the
library and read s econdary literature or do historical resea rch; or I could go to
graduate school and get a Ph.D. in English. Assuming I know of the existence of the
annotated edition, the secondary literature, and the available graduate programs,
however, my choice is a deliberate and informed one, influenced by the relative c osts
and benefits of the alternatives.
Conve rsely, cr eators o f comm unicative texts also make choices about how much
context to provide, and this choice is also influenced by the costs and benefits. An
author could spell out additional meaning in a fuller and longer text. Th is will
increase printing and shipping costs of printing as well as the time required for
reading; and will also tend to reduce spontaneity and creative experience for the
reader. Thus in literary (and especially poetic) commun ications this is no t usually
done, but it can be (consider T.S. Eliot’s The Wasteland, with its extens ive
annotations.) The sam e is true in music, painting, arts, letters, and law. The decision
whether to provide more context, however, depends on purposes of the interpretation
— or sta ted in econ omic terms, th e marginal cos ts and ben efits of contex t.
The trick is to identify the relevant costs and benefits and ho w to trade them off
against each other. In the example o f the Shakespearean play, for instance, the
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tradeoff is relatively straightforward: more time and effort versus a deeper enjoyment
of the play. Furthermore, since both the costs and benefits accrue to me personally,
there is little reason not to let me decide how I wish (putting aside p aternalistic
situations such as high school English class).In cases w here contra cts and other te xts
of legal significance are being interpreted, however, the problem is more complicated,
and the costs and benefits are more varied. For example, errors in determining
whether or not one party owed another a legal duty or whether such a duty was
breached can unde rcut incentives to comply with such duties. 65 Errors in determining
the standard of care implied by a legal duty, the amount of care that the parties
actually took in their particular case, or the damages resulting from a breach of duty
can encou rage eithe r inadeq uate or e xcessive caretakin g. 66 In contractual settings, the
parties are also intereste d in ince ntives for informa tion exc hange and for investment
in the relationship.
In summary, the problem of form versus substance in contract interpretation can
be assimilated to the problem of optimal information acquisition. From an econom ic
viewpoint, a fuller or broader context can be purchased, but only at a cost of time and
trouble, and of exacerbating certain incentive problems, so it pays to stop at some
optimal point. The next section of this essay surveys the main types of considerations
that determine th e costs and benefits of formalism, and thus the optimal stopping
point.

65. See Kaplow and Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Liability, 37 Jour nal of Law and Economics
1(1994).
66. See Craswell and Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. Law Econ. & Org. 279 (1986);
Kaplow and Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J. Law. Econ. 191 (1996).
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Choosing betwee n form and substance: a surv ey of economic criteria

The standards for measuring contractual liability and damages for breach influence
contracting parties’ behavior in many respec ts: with regard to decisions to breach, to
take advance precautions, to mitigate damages, to gather and communicate
information, to allocate risk, to make relianc e investm ents, to b ehave
opportunistically, to spend resources in litigation, and so on. The regime of contract
interpretation, because it determines how liability and damages will be assessed ex
post, has similarly widespread incentive and efficiency effects. Accordingly, given
the purposes for which I am writing, it does not make sense to try to develop a unitary
theory for choosing between form and substance, since the answer in any particular
case will turn on a comparison of various types of transaction costs. Instead, I will list
and discuss the main categories of these trans action costs, with the ho pe that a
systematic consideration of these issues will help individual parties address the
formality problem in specific contexts.
A. Direct tran saction cos ts
The most obvious consideration is the direct cost of writing contracts and litigating
contractual disputes, and these costs can be affected in various ways by formality.
Other things being equal, an agent that bases its interpretive decisions on a smaller
set of materials sh ould, wh ether it is performing o r enforcing a c ontract, require less
time and effort to c arry out its task. T hus, forma l modes of in terpretation will be
appropriate whene ver the ex po st costs of time and effort are especially large — for
example, when time is of the essence or when the oppor tunity costs of the enforcing
or performing agent's time is high. Thus, in letter of credit transactions, where the
viability of the letter of credit as a payment device depends on the speed and
administrative effic iency with which payment can be processed, formal methods of
interpretation are favored.67 Issuing banks are not suppo sed to look past the face of

67. See John F. Dola n, The Law of Letters of Credit: Commercial and Standby Credits § 3.07 at 3-25-3-36
(Warren, Gorham & Lamont 2d ed 1991); Boris Koz olchyk , The Financial Standby: A Summary
Descri ption of Practice and Related Legal Problems, 28 UCC L J 327, 334-35, 358-59 (1996); UCC §
5-103 comment 1.
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submitted documents when determining whether documentary conditions have been
satisfied, and the rule s for determin ing complian ce with su ch conditio ns is strict.
Similarly, in markets where a high level of trust among the participants is necessary
to support cooperation with regard to the performan ce of non -verifiable aspects of the
contract, and where extended disputes can undermine such trust, disputes can be kept
short and relatively painless through the application of relatively formal decision
procedures. 68
It should be recognized, however, that if the contracting parties anticipate that
formal decision procedures will be applied at the performance or enforcement stage,
they may be induced to put greater effort into specifying additional considerations or
supplying additional inte rpretive materials a t the contract-w riting stage, in order to
address some of the issues that are discussed below, such risk or performance
incentives. For example, the anticipation that issuing banks will not look beneath the
surface of any supporting documents when processing a letter of credit may induce
the issuer to provid e a more ela borate set of d ocumen tary conditions up front.
(Conversely, the prospect that any such conditions will be enforced strictly may
induce parties to provide a less elabo rate list of requirements.)
If this effect is a significant one, then the cost of considering addition al interp retive
materials ex post needs to be weighed against the costs of increased contract-writing
costs ex ante.
B. Risk
Variation in interpretive outcomes introduces risk into the contractual relationship.
Since contracting parties usually dislike risk and are w illing to expend r esources to
avoid it, they may choose between form and substance as a risk management device.
The choice will be different, however, for parties with different attitudes toward risk
or diffe rent abili ties to spre ad or dive rsify it. In the interpretive setting, outcome risk
derives from variations in the distribution of agent-specific information sets. A

68. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of th e Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115, xx (1992) (describing trust relations in the uncut diamonds
market).
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widely dispersed distribution of information sets m eans that factfinders or performers
will interpret the same materials differently. To the extent that adding additional
interpre tive material reduces this variation, it will reduce the resultant interpretation
risk. 69
For instance, suppose that judges vary in their background experienc e with regard
to commercial matters. They will accordingly differ in their reading of particular
documents, or of legal standards such as reasonableness or good faith. If the judges
are directed to inquire more deeply into the commercial context before deciding on
their interpretation, this inquiry will (at a cost) reduce variance by making the less
experienced judges' information sets more closely resemble the more experienced
judges' information sets. (One might speculate that differenc es in perspe ctive will
lead the experie nced judge s to evaluate the new material differently, thus increasing
the interpretive variance rather than decreasing it, but such an o utcome is unlikely so
long as there are d iminishing retu rns to expertise, or so lon g as the variations in
judges' evaluation of individual items of inte rpretive material a re less than fu lly
correlated, so that expanding the basis of decision will reduce total variance through
diversification and the law of large numbers.70
The value of risk red uction may help to exp lain Lisa Bernstein 's observation that
industry tribunals tend to follow relatively formal regimes of interpretation, even
though their c ost of inquirin g into substance is relatively less than that of generalist
judges. To the extent that the judges are a lready expert in the subject of the contract,
the variance among their informatio n sets is likely to be low. Thus the marginal value
of risk reduction that is purchased by the con sideration of a dditional info rmation is
likely to be smaller, and less likely to justify incurring the additional costs. The fact
that contracting parties in such settings prefer relatively formal rules when litigating

69. The conclusion would depend on the precise functional form of the information aggregation function G.
For examp le, if G were the union function ² (I, Ia ), increasing the size of the contractual information set
would reduce the va riance of G. If G were the intersection function ³ (I, Ia ), conversely, increasing the
size of the contractual infor mati on set would ha ve no effect on the variance of G.
70. Again, stated in terms of formal mathematical notation, this would depend on the precise functional form
of the information aggregation function G.
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in front of expert tribunals, accordingly, does not imply that they would have a similar
preference when litigating in front of generalist judges and juries.
Additionally, to the extent that substantive interpretation reduces the variance of
interpre tive outcomes, it is more valuable to relatively risk-averse parties, other things
being equal. Co nversely, con tracting parties w ho are less ris k-averse or who h ave
other methods of risk reduction available to them should be less willing to incur the
costs of substantive interpretation.
This latter category includes larger or mo re
diversified businesses and other c ontractual repeat players, w ho can diversify
interpretation risk over a greater number of transactions, as well as agents such as
middlemen who are likely to be on both the buying and selling side of transactions
with equal frequency. The risk factor thus provides additional explanation why such
actors tend to use standard forms, in addition to the more obvious reason of
economies of scale.
C. Performance incentives
Variation in interpretive outcome is not just a matter of risk, of course, because the
parties' anticipation of what enfo rcers will do can affect their incentive to perform
their contractua l duties. For in stance, legal error in assessing contractual damages
following breach may induce either inefficient performan ce (if the tribun al tends to
overestimate damage s ex post) or inefficient brea ch (if the tribun al tends to
overestimate damages ex post). Variations in the assessment of substantive duties
may have similar effects. For instanc e, if the tribuna l tends to overe stimate
(underestimate) the promised level of product quality by reading an express or
implied warranty more broadly (narrowly) than the parties intended, this may induce
the seller to provide too much (little) quality from an efficiency point of view. The
distributional consequences of these sorts of errors can be priced out on average, but
the efficiency consequences may remain. Lower variance in interpretive outcome,
accordingly, can provide the parties with more precise performance incentives.
The value of such increased precision, however, depends upon the parties'
circumstances, including the in formation ava ilable to them at the time they make
performance or precaution decisions an d their ability to renegotiate the contract ex

Form an d Subs tance in C ontract In terpretation

Draft, 3/10/03, p. 37

post. The fact that tribunals vary in their potential assessments of damages, for
example, should no t lead to inefficie nt breach or performance so long as the
assessment is correct on average, since the contracting parties are unlikely to know
the particular characteristics of their tribunal at the time they have to decide whether
to perform. In making their decisions, they will be in a position of uncertainty and
will only be able to com pare the co sts of performances against the expected costs of
paying damages for breach, averaged over the set of all potential tribunals. A
reduction in the tribunal's variance, accordingly, does not purchase any efficiency
gains up front, so long as the parties are not risk-averse.
On the other hand, if parties do have information about the likely direction of
tribunal error at the relevant time of decisionmaking, their incentives to perform or
take precautions against breach w ill be inefficient. For instance, suppose that a sales
contract contains a clause that requires the seller to deliver goods by June 1, but the
parties as a matter of tra de usage un derstand th e delivery date to be interpre ted
flexibly, and in their understanding the seller has the option to deliver as late as June
15 if market conditions make it unduly expensive to meet the June 1 date. If not all
courts would recognize this implicit understanding absent an inquiry into the
commercial context, a seller who does not meet the June 1 date will expect to be
found in breac h of con tract wit h some positive p robabi lity. De pendin g on the
damages that might be assessed and the expected costs of any litigation, accordingly,
he might be led to take inefficiently c ostly precau tions to guard against late delivery.
If the inefficiency losses are high enough , it would b e worth d irecting courts to
inquire into trade usage before finding any liability.71
The extent of these inefficiency losses, however, depends on the ex post costs of
disputing and renegotiation. Just because the original contract does not provide
efficient incentives for performan ce does n ot mean tha t an efficient ou tcome w ill

71. They could also write their trade usage explicitly into the con tract, but this has transaction costs of its
own and is likely to be cost-justified only for usages that are unfamiliar to a sufficient number of courts,
or that govern contingencies that are especially likely to arise. If the contingency in which trade usage
becomes relevant is a sufficiently long one, or if the likelihood of a given court being unfamiliar with it
ex post is low, th en it will be cheaper for the parties to remain silent an d to take th e risk of an in correct
interpretation.

Form an d Subs tance in C ontract In terpretation

Draft, 3/10/03, p. 38

result, because the parties can m odify the contract after the fact to reach an efficient
result. This renegotiation m ay entail an additional payment from one of the parties
to another, b ut the expe cted cost of th is paymen t can be calc ulated up front and
included in the original contract price. 72
Parties with relatively low ex post renegotiation costs, accordingly, should tend to
favor formalistic methods of interpretation, other things be ing equal. This category
includes parties who anticipate a continuing relationship, parties who engage in many
similar transactions or do business together regularly, and parties who expec t to have
symmetric information ex post regarding the costs an d benefits of performance .
Parties for whom the transaction is an unusual one, parties in one-shot contracts, and
parties wh o expect th ere to be asy mmetric inform ation ex po st should tend to favor
more substantive me thods of inte rpretation as a substitute for their ow n ability to
bargain to an efficient outcome.73 Similarly, parties who have available to them other
methods of ensuring efficient performance, such as nonlegal or reputational sanctions
administered through mem bership in a commercial subco mmunity, are less likely to
want to incur the exp enses o f substa ntive inter pretatio n, and other th ings being equal
should prefer a formalist appro ach.

D. Reliance incentives
Much of the economics-of-contracts literature has emphasized the role of
contractual liability in promoting investment in relationship-specific assets. Absent
legal protection for such investments, rational contracting pa rties will underinvest in
them from the efficiency viewpoin t, for fear of losing some or all of their value in an
ex post hold-up. The standard intuition here is that because the asset is worth little
outside the specific relationship, the party who invests in it becom es vulnerable to

72. See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61
Southern California Law Review, 629-670 (1988).
73. Compare Jason Johnston's argu ment in Bargaining Under Rules Ver sus Sta ndards, 11 Jour nal of Law,
Economics, and Organizat ion 256 1995) that legal regimes that use standards to determine liability do
a better job at encouraging bar gainin g under asymmetri c information th at regimes tha t use rules.
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threats to terminate the relationship. Such threa ts provide the n on-investing pa rty
with the bargaining power to obtain a unilaterally favorable modification. But
investors' ability to anticipate such opportunism reduces their incentive to make such
investments in the first place. In contrast to the problem of inefficient performance
and breach, ex post renegotiation cannot address this efficiency problem, since it is
precisely the prospect of such renegotiation that creates the threat of hold-up.74 It can
only guarantee that wha tever investments are made are put to efficient use .
The need to en courage spe cific investments will influence the form/substance
decision whenever the value of the investment turns on the nature of contractual
interpretation. Many investments, even if they are relationship-specific, will not
depend on interpretation in this way. For example, suppose that a supplier of
complex industrial machinery must invest substantial time and effort acquiring
expertise about the specific productio n process o f a particular cu stomer. Th is
expertise is only partially transferable to relationships with other customers and is
thus relationship-s pecific; and s o in order to be induce d to acquire it, the supplier
must be persua ded that a re lationship w ith this particular cu stomer is in the of fing.
An important way to commit to such relationship is through a binding contractual
promise. However, the value of supplier's investment in expertise need not turn on
the specific content of the contract; it may be that knowing the customer's needs
reduces the cost of providing the customer with machinery of all sorts. In this case,
the supplier need not worry about unexpected contractual interpretations that leave
the basic contract in place (for ex ample, req uiring the delivery of a machin e with this
set of characteristics rather than that), since its investment in e xpertise is equ ally sunk
with all interpretations. The possible variation in contract requirement does in volve
some risk, of course, but this can be priced out or dealt with using the other methods
described above.

74. See generally Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. Law & Econ. 297-326 (1978) (specific investments
determine appropriate scope for vert ical i ntegration of the firm); Oliver Wi lliamson, T ransaction –Cost
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. Law & Econ . 2-61 (1979) (di scussion of
specific investments as a type of transaction cost).
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On the other hand, there are some investments whose value turns on the specifics
of the task to be performed. A supplier who contracts to supply goods within a
narrow time window may need to take special precautions in storing inventory and
arranging for timely ship ment; it may con versely fail to invest in facilities that wo uld
provide it with greater flexibility to deliver outside the windo w . If the con tract is
subseque ntly interpreted to provide the customer with greater discretion in specifying
the time of delivery, the supplier can become vulnerable to holdup; it ma y have to
agree to a substantial reduction in price in ord er to induce the buyer to take d elivery
during the originally anticipated window. (Conversely, if the contract is interpreted
to require delivery within a window when one or both of the parties understood the
window to be more flexible, the party who is caught short may have to pay a
substantial ransom in exchange for being released from this unanticipated obligation.)
A second example is provided by the case of a supplier w ho promise s to supply
finely milled machine parts of a particular specification. If the contract is interpreted
to allow the buyer more leeway to alter the specifications (or conversely, to insist on
strict rather than substantive compliance with the specifications), then the supplier
will be relatively vulne rable to hold up if its retooling c osts are large, b ut relatively
invulnerable to holdup if its re tooling costs are small.
To the extent that a substantive in terpretive appro ach improve s the quality of the
enforcing tribunal's estimate of the parties' expectations (that is, to the extent that it
reduces the expected difference between the interpretive outcomes ex post and the
parties' interpretations at the time they must sink their sp ecific investmen ts), it will
reduce the potential for such holdups. P arties who find it relatively imp ortant to
undert ake interpretation- specific investm ents, or wh ose investmen ts are especia lly
vulnerable to changes in contrac tual interpretatio n, will therefo re be more likely to
want to opt into regimes of substantive interpretation, other things being eq ual.
Parties who do not need to make such investments, or whose investments are more
flexible, or who have other methods at their disposal for dealing with contractual
opportunism, will have less need for interpretive accuracy and should tend to prefer
relatively formalist regimes.
E. Rent seeking
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The discussion so far presumes that the costs of writing and litigating contra cts is
exogenous to the parties’ behavior, but more generally this is not the case.
Depending on the legal regime, the parties can do various things ex ante or ex post
to turn the bargain in their favor. Under a regime of substantive interpretation, for
instance, parties may be tempted to invest substantial resources in litigation in order
to maximize the chance of a favorable outcome. From the point of the contracting
parties together, such behavior is wasteful, except to the extent that it improves
incentives for primary behavior. From the point of view of litigants ex po st, however,
it is individually ratio nal even if there is no such in centive effect .
Formality, by limiting the scope for ex post interpretive disputes, probably reduces
the marginal productivity of litigation expenditure, and thus reduces the amount of
such expenditu re. To the e xtent that it conditions the outcome of litigation on
publicly available information, and reduces the variations of litigants' expectations
regarding that outcome, it probably also e ncourages settlement.
On the other hand, rent-seeking can take place at the contract-writing stage as well.
For example, I have elsewhere argued that one cost of enforc ing standard form
contracts according to the plain meaning of their written provisions is that those who
write such con tracts will be tempted to sneak one-sided but inefficient terms into the
fine print. 75 Non-dra fting parties will gen erally not find it worthwhile to examine
standard forms with the care required to unearth such self-serving terms, so they are
likely instead to assume that such terms have been included and discount the price
they are willing to pay accordingly. (Even if parties do examine the standard forms
of their contractual partners, conversely, such an ex amination is costly.)
Accordingly, both parties w ould find it useful to have a wa y of comm itting not to
engage in such behavior, and an interpretive regime that de-emphasizes the text of the
agreement in favor of less manipulable considerations such as market expectations
may provide such a commitment device.
But there is, at least in theory, a similar risk of such ma nipulation w ith regard to
contextual materials such as parol evidence. Just as parties may be tempted to sneak

75. [Citation omitted to preserve anonymity of submission process.]
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self-serving terms into the contractual text under a formalist interpretive regime, they
may be tempted to fill the negotiating history with self-serving proposals and offers
under a more s ubstan tive interp retive regime, in the hopes of influencing the ultimate
result. 76 I am inclined to re gard this latter risk as rela tively less importa nt, since in
most cases th e parties will have more sy mmetric and eff ective access to their common
negotiating history than they will to e ach others' stan dard forms . Blatantly selfserving attempts to ma nipulate parol evid ence are more likely to be observed and
parried during negotiatio ns, while self-serving form ter ms are more likely to escape
notice until the contingencies they relate to have materialized.77 Still, there is a
theoretical tradeoff, so c ontracting parties con cerned ab out such re nt-seeking will
want to choose b etween re latively formal an d relatively sub stantive interpretive
regimes depending upon whether they believe rent-seeking is a more significant
problem ex ante or ex p ost, and w hether it is a more significant problem with respect
to contractua l text than w ith regard to context. Certain types of contextual evidence
may be more or less subject to such manipulation; for instance, trade usage seems
fairly immune to rent-seeking ex ante, sinc e no individu al agent is in a po sition to
have a significan t effect on it. On the other hand, to the extent that usage is diffuse
and there is room to argu e about its su bstantive con tent, it is relatively susc eptible to
rent-seeking ex post. The restrictions on the admissibility of trade usage provided
by UCC 1-205(6) m ay thus be viewed as a way to le ssen the rent-seekin g costs
associated with this type of evidence.
F. Agency problems
Another common ly cited reaso n for privileging textual over contextual material
when interpreting contracts is the need to control the behavior of imperfectly loyal
agents. Here it is worth distinguishing between two kinds of agency problems:

76. Eric Posner offers this risk as a possible r eason in favor of a relatively forma listic par ol evidence rule.
See E. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra. Com pare the a nalogous ar gumen ts th at advocates of
strict statutory constr uction have made wi th respect to incentives t o create sel f-servin g legisla tive hist ory.
77. Again, this may be a contrast with the case of using legislative history in stat utory inter pretati on, since
relevant actors may find it easier to introduce self-serving statements into the official record without
being noticed by their political ad versaries.
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problems in controlling the behavior of enforcing agents ex p ost, and proble ms in
controlling the behavior of contracting agents ex an te.
1. Controlling enforcing agents ex post. — While implementing the parties'
intentions of the contracting parties is a major and perhaps primary consideration
courts interpretation of their agreements, it is far from the only factor. Courts and
other tribunals may be tempted to tailor their interp retations, if on ly marginally, in the
furtherance of other goals such as distributional equity, risk sharing ex post, or
corrective justice, as the tribunals see them. Since none of these goals are in the ex
ante interests of the contracting parties, the parties would like to arrange the
interpre tive process so as to minimize the influe nce of such consid erations, to the
extent that they can do so at reasonable cost.
One obvious way to do this is to choo se in advanc e a tribunal tha t is expected to
give greater weight to the expected value of the contract, and lesser value to the
trib una l's own co untervailing values. Choice o f law and especially arbitration clauses
are straightforward ways of implementing such a choice. But it has often been
suggested that restri cting the s cope o f admiss ible inter pretive materials has a similar
constraining e ffect.
Whether this is the case is not clear and depends on a closer study of the particular
agent in question and the professional communit y to whom the agent looks for
validation. Certainly, the expansion of the informational universe provides additional
opportunities for a court seeking to promote its own values to find justification for its
actions.78 But as the Legal Realists famously argued, a court bent on ignoring the
parties' intentions in favor of its own policy values also has substantial freedom to do
so under a more form al interpretive regime.

78. A possible example of this phenomenon may be found in Nanakuli Paving and Rock Co. v. Shell Oil, 664
F 2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981), in which the court directed the admission before a local jury of trade usage
evidence purport ing to show that Shel l had pr omised Nanakuli, a small local paving compa ny to whom
Shell was selling asphalt, that it would protect Nanakuli against any price increases that came after the
placing of Nanakuli's order and before delivery, notwithstanding a written contract term providing that
the price would be Shell's "posted price at the time of delivery," and notwithstanding the text of UCC 1205, which provides that when expr ess ter ms a nd trade usage cann ot be rea d together consist ently,
express terms control contractual meaning.
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2. Controlling c ontracting agen ts ex ante. — Many contracting pa rties are not
individuals, but organizations who can only act through individual agents. Because
the incentives of the agents are imperfectly aligned with those of the organization,
agents may not behave in a value-maximizing way when e ntering into a contract or
engaging in actions that may affect contractual terms. For example, an insurance
agent may make inaccurate representations about policy coverage or about an
app lica nt's insurability in orde r to earn a co mmission, o r a manager c harged with
supervising a supplier's obligations m ay shirk b y failing to object to defective
performance, thus pro viding the supplier with a plausible claim of w aiver.
In such contexts, formalism can be used by one group of organizational actors to
disable other actors from binding the organization on terms that might be in the latter
actors’ private interests, but not the interests of the organization.79 Merger clauses,
for example, can be used to take contracting power away from the sales and
purchasing agents who orally repres ent the organ ization in its dealings with outsiders,
and to consolidate that power in the managers and legal professionals who control the
official texts of company do cuments. Similarly, anti-waive r clauses can be used to
protect an organization against shirking by its enforcement agents.
It is important to recognize, however, that the individu als who control the formal
text of an organization's contractual agreement are no less agents than those who
control the less formal context. Most commercial form contracts are drafted by
lawyers, either in-house or not, w hose com pensation s tructure provid es them w ith
incentives that are not identical or even proportional to the benefits and costs to the
firm that employs them. For example, a company lawyer charged with drafting terms
in a standard form is probably more likely to be punished for omitt ing a term that

79. See, e.g., Kevin Davis, Licensin g Lies: Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule and Pre-contractual
Misrepresentations, 33 Val. U. L. Rev. 485 (1999) (arguing that in the interests of minimizing agency
costs, sophisticated commercial parties should be allowed to disclaim liability for their agents’ extracontractual representations); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 533 (1998) (suggesting that rational firms
consider the costs of shirking by agents when adopting merger clauses); Katz, On the Use of Practiti oner
Sur veys in Commercial Law Research: Comments on Daniel Keating’s ‘Exploring the Battle of the
Forms in Action’, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2760, 2768-70 (2000) (offering agency-cost interpretation of the
battle of the forms).
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turns out to lead in some remote contingency to a loss for the firm, than he or s he is
to be rewarded for the time saved by the omission in the far more probable event that
the term is unne cessary. T he asymm etric nature of the payoff will lead the lawyer to
overdraft the contract. Similarly, the lawyer is unlikely to be rewarded for creating
terms that increase the value of the contract to the organization's customers or, if he
or she w orks in isolation from the sales department, even to know what such terms
might be. For that reason, h e or she will likely dra ft terms that are in efficiently
favorable to the organization from a business viewpoint, that is, which shift risks and
duties to customers that are more efficiently borne by the lawyer's organization.
Adjusting the contract so that it better fits the needs of th e customer and makes h im
or her willing to buy, accordingly, is a task usually left to the sales agents of the firm.
Thus, an organization should favor formal over substantive methods of
interpretation if it has establishe d relatively efficien t incentive structures for
contro lling the b ehavior o f its legal de partmen t, and re latively ine fficient in centive
structures for controllin g the b ehav ior of its sa les and purch asing dep artments. If the
agency problems are greater with respect to the organization's lawyers, conversely,
it should prefer a less formal interpretive regime. The optimal choice may depend on
the administrative tools available, and on other agency problems that the organization
faces. For example, due to difficulties in monitoring the effort level of sales agents,
it may be desirab le to give them high-powered incentives by providing the bulk of
their compensation in the form of commissions. Given the incentives set up by the
commission system, it may then make sens e to limit the sales staff's ability to vary
contract terms by use of standard forms including a merger clause, especially if the
law yer 's compen sation is reaso nably w ell tied to the overall profits of the firm. On
the other hand , if it is feasible to establish a chargeback system whereby sales agents'
earnings are reduced in an amou nt proportio nal to the number of disputes arising out
of their sales, or by the ex tra costs necessary to service the sp ecial terms pro mised to
their customers, and if the lawyer drafting the contract is an independent contractor
rather than an ongoing member of the organization, then the sale s agents may be in
a better position to balance the costs and benefits to the organization when making
informal promises and representations.
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G. Liquidity and the cost of other complementary services
Finally, the optimal choice between form and substance may depend on the
importance of third-party contributions to the value of the contract. For exam ple, a
buyer of commercial machinery may need to borrow funds in order to p ay for its
purchase, and will usually be able to borrow at a lower rate if it pledges the
machinery as collat eral. Simila rly, a sel ler of co nsume r goods w ill be able to make
credit sales at a lower price if it can sell its custo mer accou nts to a commercial factor,
who sp ecializes in bu ying such ac counts an d can service them and b ear default risk
at a lower cost. Another example would be a buyer who purchases two specialized
pieces of equipment from two different suppliers, when the two items are intended
to be used together; in this case the terms of the buyer's arrangement with one
supplier (e.g., terms granting the supplier the discretion to alter the specifications)
will affect the terms it can get from the other supp lier.
In such cases, the third party's ability to provide such complementary services at
low cost will depend in part on the cost it faces when determining the terms of the
supported contract. If a facto r has to wo rry about an account d ebtor asserting
defenses when it comes time to collect on the acc ount, the am ount it is willing to lend
against the account will be reduc ed accordingly. If the factor can effectively assess
the risk of such defenses from an examinatio n of the un derlying con tract's text,
however, it can price the risk out, hold back an amount in reserve that corresponds
to the expected value of uncollectible accounts, and lend the balance. If the
existence of such defenses depends upon more contextual factors, such as oral
communications between the account debtor and the seller's sales agents, the factor
will need to be more co nservative and will no t be able to len d at the same rate or in
the same amount. Casting the account in the form of a negotiable instrument,
however, or including a holder-in-due course clause in the original sales agree ment,
low ers the factor's costs by reducing the risk of nonpayment resulting from a cause
that the factor could not assess ex ante. Other formal devices, including merger
clauses, anti-waiver clauses, and the like, similarly lower the costs to third parties of
providing supporting se rvices, and thu s enable those parties to provide the services
at lower co st.
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In general, con tracts whose value depends significantly on the participation of or
the purchase of complementary services from third parties will have higher value
when interpreted under a relatively formalistic regime, other things being equal. But
this conclusion need not always hold. In some cases, the relevant third party may
face higher costs w hen assess ing contractua l text than when assessing contextual
factors such as trad e usage. If the third party is not a legal spe cialist, for example, as
in the case of a third-party guaranty supplied by a friend or family member of the
primary obligor, or in the case of a trade creditor who finds it cheaper to observe the
parties' ordinary business actions and informal commercial reputations than to
examine the details of th eir written co ntract, then a more su bstantive app roach to
interpretation will protect the third party at lower cost, and thus will make him or her
willing to provide the complemen tary services on more favorable terms.

V.

Conclusion

Interpretation is an essential aspect of all fields of law — statutory, common–law,
and constitutiona l — but it looms e speciall y large in the area of contracts. This is so
for two interrelated reasons. F irst, from an ex post perspe ctive, judicial officia ls
called on to enforce an asserted private agreeme nt as law fac e special difficu lties in
determining whether the agreemen t was actu ally established, w hat obligations it
provides, and what to do if the agreement’s terms appear incomplete, ambiguous, or
contradictory. Contractu al lawma king is typically decentralized, acts of legal
significance commonly take place in private, the participants are often legal amateurs,
and their purposes an d methods of com munication are highly varied. In contrast to
a professional legislature with its public records and voting proced ures, or a court
with its officia l rulings an d publi shed o pinion s, individ ual con tracting p arties can
regard themselves as having created legal obligations over a period of time without
being able to identify the precise moment at which such obligations came into force.
It should be no surprise that disagreements over interpretation are a primary cause of
litigated contract disputes.
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Second, from an ex ante perspective, contracting parties have substantial leeway
to influence subsequent interpretation by the manner in which they conclud e their
agreement. They ca n take more o r less care to identify their underlying assumptions
and to commu nicate their inte ntions to eac h other; they can anticip ate possible
interpretative disp utes and se ttle them in adva nce; and th ey can cre ate and preserve
evidence of their understandings through the use of writings and other permanent
documents, independent w itnesses, and terms of art. Helping the parties to translate
their underlying bargain into something that can actually be applied to guide (if not
to bind) their subsequent behavior is the main professional task a transactional lawyer
faces.
Most schola rly discu ssion o f interpre tive problems, e specially those dealin g with
the tension betw een form a nd substan ce, how ever, has bee n addresse d to courts and
other public lawmakers, and not to private ones . The partic ipants in this discussion
have argued for formal and for substantive approaches to interpretation, and have
based their recommendations on grounds of efficiency, fairness, and party autonomy.
This essay has argued that the traditional scholarly approach to form and substance
founders on a lack of in formation ab out the likely consequences of formal and
substan tive modes of interpretation. From an e fficiency view point, the information
available at the general leve l at which c ourts and le gislatures must oper ate is
inadequa te to determine the relative magnitude of the relevant transaction costs.
From an autonomy viewpoint, the traditional settle of the co urt system ne glects the
possibility that d ifferent parties in different con texts might prefer — or ought to be
delegated the power to choose — one interpretive approach over other. One does see
distinctions drawn in the case law and in the commentary between different sorts of
contracts; it is generally acknowledged that forma lism is relatively more important to
experienced commercial actors, and substantive interpretation better su ited to
transactions involving consumers and other amateurs. But as far as I know there has
been no systematic attempt to determine, using the standard tools and methods of the
economics of contracts, in which c ontexts and for which parties forma lism is most
useful and in which contexts and for which parties a substantive approach is most
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useful. This essay aims to lay out a basic framework within which such a sys tematic
analysis could take place.

